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Comparative Economic 
Organization—Within and 
Between Countries 
WITOLD J. HENISZ1 & OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON 2 
' University of Pennsylvania & 2 University of California at Berkeley 
A B S T R A C T This paper explores the implications of going beyond transaction cost theory's 
implicit focus on domestic investors to include multinational actors. As developed herein, the 
discriminating alignment between the level of hazards (contractual and/or political) and the mode 
of governance carries over. In the open-economy context, such an alignment reflects the hazards 
that arise from the nature of the transaction and those that arise from the nature of the political 
and regulatory environment. 
1. Introduction 
We examine comparative economic organization through the lens of transaction 
cost economics. The argument proceeds in four parts. 
We begin by holding the institutional environment (rules of the game) 
constant and examine the organization of economic activity as between alterna-
tive modes of governance—markets, hybrids, firms and bureaus. We then 
examine the effects of changes in the institutional environment, over time or 
between countries, on investment and organization by domestic firms. We then 
extend our analysis to examine investment and contracting in which the multina-
tional corporation is a key actor. Investment and contracting in various countries 
that have recently experienced economic crises which have altered investor's 
perceptions of the institutional environment are then briefly examined. 
In effect, ours is a bottom-up view of the nation-state in which the microan-
alytics of organization are featured. We do not focus on familiar macroeconomic 
conditions, such as the aggregate level of investment, the rate of growth, 
unemployment, and the like. Rather, we ask how does economic activity get 
organized under different institutional regimes. An interesting by-product of this 
exercise is that it ought to be possible to infer, from knowledge of the 
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organization of economic activity in a country, some of the gross features of the 
institutional environment. 
Our efforts to link the institutional environment and the organization of 
economic activity should be of interest at several levels: to economists seeking 
mechanisms to link variation in the structure of a nation's political institutions 
and economic outcomes; to managers seeking to expand their operations beyond 
their home countries; and to policymakers seeking to influence or shape the 
evolution of economic activity in their country. By jointly considering the effect 
of political and contractual hazards on economic organization, this paper 
advances previous work in this domain that has traditionally considered the 
impact of variation in the institutional environment or in the characteristics of 
the transaction on governance. Even in those studies that examine both effects 
simultaneously, the mechanisms by which the hazards emanating from the 
characteristics of the transaction and from the institutional environment may 
interact have received only preliminary attention. 
The institutional environment itself operates at two levels: an informal 
level—the norms, customs, mores, religion; and a formal level—the polity, 
judiciary, laws of contract and property. Of these two, we emphasize the latter. 
It is important to realize that the institutional environment is rich: a lot of things 
have a bearing on the efficacy of contract and organization. This variety can be 
treated in both piecemeal and composite ways. We do both. 
2. The baseline setup 
Transaction cost economics is a comparative contractual approach to economic 
organization in which the action resides in the details of transactions on the one 
hand and governance on the other. Given that all complex contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete (by reason of bounded rationality) and that contract as 
mere promise, unsupported by credible commitments, is not self-enforcing (by 
reason of opportunism1), the question is which transactions should be organized 
how. 
Much of the predictive content of transaction cost economics works through 
the discriminating alignment hypothesis, according to which transactions, which 
differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in 
their costs and competences, so as to effect a (mainly) transaction cost econo-
mizing result. Implementing this requires that transactions, governance struc-
tures, and transaction cost economizing all be described. What are the defining 
attributes of transactions? What are the attributes with respect to which gover-
nance structures differ? What main purposes are served by economic organiza-
tion? How is transaction cost economizing accomplished? 
According to John R. Commons, 'the ultimate unit of activity ... must contain 
in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality, and order. This unit is a 
transaction' ? Transaction cost economics concurs that the transaction is the basic 
unit of analysis and regards governance as the means by which order is 
1. 'Self-interest seeking with guile' (Williamson, 1996, p. 6). 
2. Commons (1932), p. 4. 
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accomplished in a relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset 
opportunities to realize mutual gains. 
The problem of conflict on which transaction cost economics originally 
focused is that of bilateral dependency.3 The organization of transactions that 
are supported by generic investments is easy: classical market contracting 
works well because each party can go its own way with minimal cost to the 
other. Specific investments are where the problems arise. Contracts that are 
supported by durable investments in nonredeployable assets pose contractual 
hazards, in that one or both parties can defect from the letter or spirit of an 
agreement. That is true even if property rights are 'well defined', contract 
laws are 'well conceived', and the judiciary enforces the laws in a 'principled 
way'. 
Thus even if property rights are well defined in general, some property rights 
are very hard to describe (it is not cost effective to describe them with greater 
precision) and hard to enforce (it is difficult for a court to be apprised of true 
underlying conditions). Property rights ambiguities thus remain even in a regime 
where best efforts to define and enforce property rights through the courts have 
been made. Similar considerations apply to contract law: there are limits on 
how exacting the law can be and how effectively it can be enforced by the 
courts. 
The upshot is that a huge amount of property right protection and contract law 
enforcement is moved out of the courts and onto private ordering. As Marc 
Galanter has put it, in 'many instances the participants can devise more 
satisfactory solutions to their disputes than can professionals constrained to 
apply general rules on the basis of limited knowledge of the dispute'.4 The courts 
are thus reserved for purposes of ultimate appeal. 
The alignment of transactions to alternative modes of private ordering— 
principally markets, hybrids, and hierarchies—is where the main action resides. 
Taking adaptation (of autonomous and cooperative kinds) to be the central 
problem of economic organization, the basic alignment is that simple transac-
tions (by which we mean those that pose few contractual hazards) will be 
organized in markets and that transactions thereafter move to hybrids and, 
eventually, to unified ownership (hierarchy) as contractual hazards build up. 
These regularities are shown by the solid governance cost schedules in Figure 1. 
When contractual hazards are low, more complex forms of organization are at 
a disadvantage since they incur 'added bureaucratic costs for which no benefits 
can be ascribed'.5 However, as contractual hazards increase, 'the high-powered 
incentives of the market impede adaptability ... and maladaptation costs are 
incurred. Although the transfer of such transactions from market to hierarchy 
creates added bureaucratic costs, those costs may be more than offset by the 
bilateral adaptive gains that result'.6 The data are corroborative.7 
3. See Williamson (1975) and Klein et al. (1978). 
4. Galanter (1981), p. 4. 
5. Williamson (1996), p. 106. 
6. Williamson (1996), pp. 106-107. 
7. See Shelanski and Klein (1995), Lyons (1995), and Crocker and Masten (1996). 
263 
Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 4:14 PM
Witold J. Henisz & Oliver E. Williamson 
3. Shift parameters for domestic investors 
The basic setup holds the institutional environment constant (and normally 
assumes that property rights and contract law regimes are strong). Comparisons 
within a country (over time) or between countries (cross-sectionally) can be 
made by introducing differences of property right and contractual kinds. 
Unsurprisingly, more secure property rights regimes will elicit more invest-
ment in durable, nonredeployable assets as well as those assets with weak 
appropriability regimes, ceteris paribus,8 Also, contract law changes that shift 
the relative costs of governance will induce transactions to be moved into what 
have now become the (comparatively) lower cost modes. 
By comparison with market and hybrid modes of governance, where interfirm 
contracting disputes are presented to the courts for purposes of ultimate appeal, 
hierarchy settles most of its own conflicts internally. Accordingly, changes in 
contract law will be concentrated on market and hybrid modes of governance. A 
change in contract law that improves the quality of enforcement will therefore 
reduce the governance costs of market and hybrid contracting as compared with 
hierarchy. More transactions will thus be mediated by spot and long-term 
contracts in regimes where contract enforcement works well. Such changes are 
shown by the move from solid to dashed lines in Figure 1. 
Changes in intellectual property rights can be interpreted similarly. Where 
such property rights protection is weak, firms that engage in interfirm contracting 
Contractual Hazards 
FIGURE 1. The simple shift parameter framework. 
8. See Teece (1986a), Grandy (1989), Henisz and Zelner (1999), and Keefer (1996). 
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run the risk that knowledge of innovations will leak out.9 Such firms will 
organize more economic activity internally, thereby to reduce the hazard of 
leakage. The downward shift of market and hybrid governance curves in Figure 
1 can be interpreted as an improvement in the intellectual property rights, 
thereby supporting greater interfirm contracting. 
The overall composition of investment and contracting will reflect changes 
of both investment and organizational kinds.10 Such considerations have begun 
to make their way into the public policy literature, especially in relation to 
the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for differential efficacy of 
privatization and deregulation as a function of the institutional environment.11 
A noteworthy feature of this literature is that nominal changes in contract 
and property rights laws do not necessarily imply effective changes. There is 
a need to go beyond the (nominal) laws on the books to consider the de facto 
laws, which brings in the credibility (or lack thereof) of the mechanisms of 
enforcement. 
A related concern is to ascertain the ease with which even de facto changes 
in the law of property or contract can be reversed, which brings in the polity. 
Issues of credible commitment are posed. As Barry Weingast has put it, 'In 
important respects, the logic of political institutions parallels that of economic 
institutions. To borrow Williamson's phrase, the political institutions of society 
create a "governance structure" that at once allows the society to deal with 
on-going problems as they arise and yet provides a degree of durability to 
economic and political rights. Importantly, these help limit the ability of the state 
to act opportunistically'.12 
Thus, whereas promises (mere words) are easy to utter, credible promises 
require more. Janos Kornai's observation that craftsmen and small shopkeepers 
fear expropriation in Hungary despite 'repeated official declarations that their 
activity is regarded as a permanent feature of Hungarian socialism' is pertinent.13 
That 'many of them are myopic profit maximizers, not much interested in 
building up lasting goodwill ... or by investing in long-lived fixed assets'14 is 
partly explained by the fact that 'These individuals or their parents lived through 
the era of confiscations in the forties'.15 
But there is more to it than that. Not only is there a history of expropriation, 
but, as of 1986, the structure of the government had not changed in such a way 
as to assuredly forestall subsequent expropriations. Official declarations will be 
more credible only with long experience or if accompanied by a credible (not 
easily reversible) reorganization of politics. As one Polish entrepreneur once 
remarked, Ί don't want expensive machines. If the situation changes, I'll get 
9. See Teece (1986a). 
10. See Riordan and Williamson (1985) and Williamson (1991). 
11. See Heller and McCubbins (1996), Henisz (1999a), Levy and Spiller (1994), Noll and Rosenbluth (1995), 
Ramamurti (1996), Willig (1994), and World Bank (1995). 
12. Weingast (1993), p. 233. 
13. Koraai (1986), pp. 1705-1706. 
14. Kornai (1986), p. 1706. 
15. Kornai (1986), p. 1705. 
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stuck with them'.16 Note, in this connection, that the objectivity of the law is 
placed in jeopardy if the law and its enforcement are under the control of a 
one-party state.17 Credibility will be enhanced if a monarch who has made the 
law 'may not make it arbitrarily, and until he has remade it—lawfully—he is 
bound by it'.18 Self-denying ordinances and, even more, inertia that has been 
crafted into the political process, have commitment benefits.19 
When credibility is absent, the state may need to become the fallback investor 
for durable, nonredeployable assets. Thus, whereas sometimes state ownership 
occurs because the state wants to be so engaged, sometimes it occurs by default: 
the risk-adjusted rate of return is so high that private investment cannot be 
supported. Indeed, that is precisely the argument of Levy and Spiller in their 
examination of privatization of telecommunications in five countries.20 When 
there is an absence of confidence in the independence and integrity of the 
judiciary, private investors run the risk that regulation will be arbitrary and 
capricious. Faced with those hazards, they will be prepared to pay little for 
pre-existing investments and will manage those investments with an emphasis on 
immediate returns. Such hazards are especially great in parliamentary regimes, 
where legislative and executive branches are under common control. 
4. Shift parameters for multinational corporations 
Our purpose here is to go beyond the simple shift parameter framework for 
domestic firms to include multinational firms and their relations with host-
country partners as these are influenced by the property rights regime of a host 
country. 
Informal (including language and cultural) differences in the institutional 
environment aside, if the formal institutional environment is identical (or very 
similar) in the host and home country, the multinational firm will decide the 
make or buy decision with primary reference to the same tradeoff in the host 
country as it does with home country suppliers. In that event, the argument from 
Section 2 carries over. 
A substantial body of empirical work within international business has 
examined the question of appropriate governance for multinational subsidiaries 
through just such a comparative lens. These studies consistently find support for 
the proposition of a discriminating alignment between high contractual hazards 
and more hierarchical governance.21 Added complications appear, however, 
when the analysis is expanded to include host countries where the institutional 
environment differs substantially from the home country. And, of course, 
language or cultural differences that have economizing consequences need to be 
16. New York Times, 25 October 1989, pp. A l , A10. 
17. See Berman (1983), p. 37. 
18. Berman (1983), p. 9. 
19. See North and Weingast (1989). 
20. See Levy and Spiller (1994). 
21. See Blodgett (1991), Davidson and McFetridge (1985), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Gomes-Casseres 
(1989,1990), Hennart (1991), Hill et al. (1990), Hladik (1985), Kogut and Singh (1988), Murtha (1991), Oxley 
(1997, 1999), and Ramachandran (1993). 
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factored into the choice of governance.22 We set the latter aside and focus on 
formal features. 
In countries where the government's commitments to a given structure of 
taxation and/or regulation or even a set of property rights are easily changed, 
multinational corporations face added political hazards of two kinds. First, the 
government is more likely to behave in an opportunistic manner for its own 
benefit. Second, the host-country partner or a host-country competitor may 
opportunistically approach the government with requests to take actions that 
have the effect of favoring them at the expense of the multinational. We label 
these direct and indirect political hazards, respectively. In both of these cases, 
the multinational corporation faces added hazards relative to the host-country 
firm due to the differential access to the political process that arises by reason 
of nationality. Thus whereas opportunism that originates with the state and 
opportunistic use of the state are everywhere a concern, they are a special 
concern in cross-national contracting and investment. 
Recent headlines provide examples of each of these hazards. Direct political 
hazards are of daily concern to foreign firms operating in Russia. Firms as 
diverse as General Electric and Ben & Jerry's have recently pulled out of the 
country, citing arbitrary and capricious taxation and regulation. Enterprising 
politicians are a chronic concern. Coca-Cola's St. Petersburg bottling plant 
was recently threatened with having its fire permit revoked, leading to a 
forced closure, awaiting a $lm 'donation' to the local fire inspectorate for the 
construction of a new fire station.23 
Indirect political hazards have also received much publicity recently, es-
pecially in regard to the lack of transparency in the newly struggling East Asian 
economies. The tax breaks and import protection provided to Indonesian Presi-
dent Suharto's son for the construction of a national car that severely disadvan-
taged the investments made by Japanese and European car companies under the 
assumption that they would receive the preferential terms are one example. 
Another comes from the Philippines where Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Ports 
has twice won bids over the Philippines-based ICTSI to operate a new container 
terminal at Subic Bay. The perception is that it would be able to handle a larger 
volume of cargo and begin operations more quickly. ICTSI, however, has twice 
successfully lobbied President Ramos to personally intervene and require an 
additional round of bidding. Hutchinson Ports' managing director John Meredith 
now believes that his company's bids will continue to be overturned until ICTSI 
24 
wins. 
Given the presence of such political distortions and/or expropriation hazards, 
the multinational firm needs to examine: (1) whether partnering with a domestic 
supplier provides relief because the domestic supplier can beneficially influence 
political and regulatory practice; (2) whether the use of gray or black markets 
provides relief from the 'grabbing hand' of the state by making the transaction 
22. See Davidson and McFetridge (1985), Hamilton and Biggart (1988), Kogut and Singh (1988), Loree and 
Guisinger (1995), and Shane (1992). 
23. The Economist, 6 September 1997, p. 68. 
24. The Economist, 1 February 1997, pp. 64-65. 
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harder for public authorities to detect; and (3) whether such partnering or 
reliance on informal economic organization is fraught with added contractual 
hazards because partner and polity will prospectively work in concert to the 
disadvantage of the multinational. 
One vein of literature advises multinational firms to acquire 'bargaining 
power' when confronted by direct political hazards. Firms with strong competi-
tive advantages—due to unique technological resources, marketing skills, capital 
resources or scale economies—will possess a strategic advantage in negotiations 
with host-country governments.25 They will be better able to deal with host 
government controls over market access or propensities to subsidize domestic 
producers or competitors.26 The main conclusion from this literature is that 
expropriation hazards will be reduced if multinationals have relatively high 
bargaining power compared to the host-country government and can maintain 
that edge through strategic management of firm assets or through political 
lobbying.27 
A problem with this argument is that ex ante strategic bargaining advantages 
largely evaporate as soon as the multinational has made durable and immobile 
investments in the host country.28 Confronted with this prospect, multinational 
firms should look ahead and work out the organizational ramifications of such 
hazards. What direct and indirect (organizational) instruments will mitigate these 
hazards? 
Partnering with a host-country firm is one possibility. Choices between and 
tradeoffs within legal and extra-legal modes of trading will need to be examined. 
Remaining within the legitimate (legal) sector, the main tradeoff to be faced is 
how much of an added stake should be awarded to host country workers, 
managers, and investors (over and above those that are warranted by 'simple' 
efficiency considerations) by reason of direct political hazards. The idea here is 
to reduce the hazards of political expropriation by loading a greater fraction of 
the costs of expropriation onto domestics to which the polity will be more 
deferential.29 
This deference derives from the higher political costs—unemployment, 
reduced tax revenue, political contributions and votes—and lower political 
benefits—through appeal to national pride and/or sovereignty—obtained in the 
expropriation of wholly or partly domestic partners as compared with entirely 
foreign firms (where the latter are normally assumed to use lower levels 
of domestic factors due to the 'liability of foreignness').30 While assistance 
from the home country government, private-sector consultants and support 
from multilateral institutions may reduce these disadvantages, such relief is 
costly. 
25. See Fagre and Wells (1982) and LeCraw (1984). 
26. See Doz and Prahalad (1981), Gomes-Casseres (1990), and Murtha (1993). 
27. See Poynter (1985). 
28. See Vernon (1971) and Teece (1986b). 
29. This hypothesis is strongly supported by the only available empirical study, which was conducted by Bradley 
(1977). The author finds that expropriation of joint ventures exclusively between foreign multinationals is 
eight times as likely as expropriation of joint ventures that involve local partners. 
30. See Zaheer (1995). 
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A wide body of empirical evidence supports the proposition that, ceteris 
paribus, local partners will be more likely to receive a share of equity ownership 
in countries with high political hazards.31 Note that from the perspective of the 
multinational firms this involves a less hierarchical governance structure. 
Recourse to illegitimate (gray market or black market) trading is another 
option. To be sure, this poses hazards of its own. Some transactions, however, 
may be easy to disguise or hide, whereupon they can be placed outside the reach 
of oppressive regulation/taxation/bureaucratization/manipulation. Theoretical 
work by Bannerjee,32 Che and Qian,33 and Hay et al.,34 support the proposition 
that firms faced with political hazards have greater recourse to illegitimate 
behavior. Qualitative studies by De Soto35 in Peru and Kaufman and Kaliberda36 
and Black et al., 37 in Russia on the prevalence of the underground economy in 
countries with predatory institutional environments is also corroborative. Prelim-
inary quantitative work demonstrates that the use of trade credit in transition 
economies varies in both the perceived reliability of ex post enforcement 
mechanisms (confidence in the courts and membership in trade associations) and 
the accessibility of ex ante information (membership in relevant social and 
business network and geographic proximity.)38 
The above discussion links organizational choices to the level of a nation's 
political hazards, but the possibility that intrafirm and interfirm contractual 
hazards may be exacerbated by the polity also bears remark. In the degree to 
which partnering by a multinational with a local firm poses added hazards by 
reason of a compliant polity to which the local partner enjoys better access, the 
choice of governance will be tilted away from partnering in favor of vertical 
integration. 
One example of such magnified contractual hazards is the ongoing shareholder 
dispute in the Russian firm of Novolipetsk. A group of foreign investors—who, 
along with Russian partners, own 40% of the firm's equity—have been stymied 
in their attempts to nominate board members. Documents sent by the group are 
repeatedly not received or miss the deadline despite the contrary evidence of 
registered mail and courier service receipts. Dimitry Vasiliev, chairman of the 
Federal Securities Commission claims 'At the moment, I have insufficient 
enforcement powers. I cannot fine directors or put them in jail'; he says 
'shareholders must decide these questions in civil courts'. Needless to say, the 
Russian managers and workers who own the remaining 60% of the equity are 
taking advantage of the lack of enforcement powers by the Securities Com-
mission to secure benefits for themselves through the use of hidden financial 
31. See Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Brouthers (1995), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Goodnow and Hansz 
(1972), Kogut and Singh (1988), Oxley (1999), Phillips-Patrick (1991), Scholhammer and Nigh (1984), and 
Shane (1992). 
32. See Banerjee (1997). 
33. See Che and Qian (1998). 
34. See Hay et al. (1996). 
35. See DeSoto (1989). 
36. See Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996). 
37. See Black et al. (1999). 
38. See Johnson et al. (1999). 
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Hazards 
FIGURE 2. Political hazards, contractual hazards and governance. 
accounts and the awarding of supply contracts to their confederates on the basis 
of terms other than price and quality. 
In a heuristic way, the relations are as shown in Figure 2, where the level of 
contractual hazards (as indexed by the condition of asset specificity) is on the 
horizontal axis and the transaction costs of contract (X) and ownership (H) are 
shown on the vertical axis. The reference condition, where the property rights 
regime is the same in the multinational's home country and in the host country, 
is shown by subscript 1. Added direct political hazards in the host country 
increase the cost of ownership, which is shown as a vertical displacement from 
Η ι to Η2. The displacement is vertical as assets of all types are equally affected 
by the potential for arbitrary and capricious government action of the type faced 
by Ben & Jerry's or Coca Cola in Russia. 
Indirect political hazards posed by the partnering firm in the host country 
increase the cost of contracting in an amount proportional to the level of 
contractual hazards posed by the transaction and are shown as a rotation of X\ 
to X2. In this case, the magnitude of the increase in governance costs is not 
independent of the level of contractual hazards. Where the potential returns to 
opportunistic behavior are high, the creation of an additional (non-market) 
mechanism by which the host country partner may act to the detriment of their 
foreign partner increases the hazards faced by the multinational firm by 
relatively more than in the absence of contractual hazards. 
For example, consider the case of two firms seeking to establish a manufactur-
ing operation in a country with a strong property rights regime. One firm 
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employs a generic production technology and the second a firm-specific technol-
ogy safeguarded in the home country through trade secrets. Despite the differ-
ences in their production technologies and the threat of technological leakage, 
both firms receive sufficient value from their local partners in terms of local 
information that they minimize governance costs in the host country by partner-
ing. As the low level of political hazards implies a low probability of achieving 
a change in the current policy regime, neither local partner finds lobbying 
host-country political actors for a policy intervention that would alter the 
distribution of returns between the local partner and the multinational to have a 
positive expected value. If political hazards increase in the host country, both 
operations face the threat that the government will alter tax, regulatory or other 
relevant policies to their detriment. However, the incentives faced by the two 
local partners differ substantially. In the first case, the local partner may find it 
advantageous to lobby the government for changes in policy that change the 
distribution of returns between the multinational and the local partner. However, 
in the second case, the local partner may seek not only to shift the distribution 
of returns but also to manipulate the political system in a way that transfers 
ownership of a potentially rent-generating technology from the multinational to 
the local partner. The incentives for opportunistic behavior in the non-market 
arena are clearly larger in the latter case. Ceteris paribus, the governance costs 
for partnerships should increase by a larger amount for transactions with higher 
levels of contractual hazards (in this case, a firm-specific production technology) 
as compared to transactions with lower levels of contractual hazards (in this 
case, a generic production technology). 
Returning to Figure 2, the upshot is that: 
(1) contract (partnering) is the least cost mode under the reference condition 
(Ηι,Χι) up to value kA, but gives way to ownership as contractual hazards 
continue to increase beyond 
(2) direct political hazards increase the attractiveness of partnering up to the 
level of kB (H2,X&, 
(3) indirect political hazards reduce the attractiveness of partnering back to the 
level of kc (H2yX2). 
Though we have shown point C (and kc) to fall on the right of point A (and 
*A), such that a weakening of the property rights regime leads to an increase in 
the range of transactions for which partnering is the least cost governance mode, 
point C (and kc) may also be on the left of point A (and kA). In this case, a 
weakening of the property rights regime would lead to a decrease in the range 
of contractual hazards for which partnering is the least cost governance mode. 
The actual direction of this shift will depend on the slopes of the X and Η 
schedules and the magnitude of their shift and rotation (which reflect the relative 
magnitude of direct and indirect political hazards faced by the multinational firm 
and the relationship between these hazards and transaction costs). 
While we are unable to make definitive predictions regarding the impact of a 
weakening of the property right regime on the range of transactions over which 
partnering will be favored in a given country, we are able to make specific 
predictions regarding the impact of such an decrease in credibility on transac-
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tions with low as compared with high contractual hazards. For the sake of 
expositional convenience, consider the transaction with contractual hazards 
given by kA.39 Under the reference condition (H\,X\) the transaction costs 
associated with organizing this transaction as a partnership and a wholly owned 
enterprise are identical (TC(Hi(kA) = TC(X\(kA)). However, after the weakening 
of the property rights regime (H2J(2), it is now cost effective to organize the 
transaction kA by supplanting ownership by partnership 
(TC(H2(kA) < TC(X2(kA)). Now consider the transaction with contractual hazards 
given by kc. Initially, transaction costs were minimized under ownership 
(TC(H\(kc)< TC(X\(kc)). However, after the weakening of the property rights 
regime, the transaction costs associated with partnership Χι and ownership Hi 
are identical (TC(H 2 (k c ) = TC(X2(kc)). 
Regardless of the relative location of point C and point A, it will be true that 
at sufficiently low levels of contractual hazards a weakening of the property 
rights regime will increase the attractiveness of partnership. However, as the 
level of contractual hazards increases, the strength of this relationship will 
diminish and could even be such that ownership is increasingly attractive. The 
main result that emerges from our analysis is that the impact of variation in 
property rights regimes either across countries or over time on the relative costs 
of governance of partnership and ownership will depend crucially on the level 
of contractual hazards posed by the individual transaction. 
Earlier research on the origins of the multinational corporation concluded that 
the same assets which provide multinational corporations economic advantage 
over host country competitors give rise to contractual hazards in relations with 
local trading partners.40 In that event, the high contractual hazards that are 
endemic in the overseas operations of multinational corporations make it likely 
that some multinationals will respond to the presence of political hazards by 
eschewing partnerships with host country firms.41 
Empirical tests of this theory require two types of data: first, a measure of the 
institutional environment of a given country in a given year which centers upon 
the notion of credible commitment; and, second, measures of contractual hazards 
in the operations of multinational corporations. As it turns out, much of the 
empirical work cited above fails to provide either or both of these measures.42 
Recent empirical analyses by Henisz,43 Murtha,44 and Oxley45 demonstrate that 
39. Note that given the magnitude of the shift and rotation employed here, k\ (the intersection between the original 
partnership and ownership schedules) is sufficiently low to pose a contrast to ιts- While this may not always 
be the case, there will always be some level of contractual hazards sufficiently low such that the governance 
costs of partnership are reduced relative to ownership. 
40. See Buckley and Casson (1976) and Caves (1996) for excellent reviews of the determinants of 
internationalization. 
41. Note that the foregoing assumes that the level of contractual hazards (the value of it) is given. In fact, k is 
a decision variable and will be chosen (in part) with reference to the condition of political hazards. This 
introduces added complications which, for the purposes of this paper, are treated as second order and are 
ignored. 
42. See Note 31. 
43. See Henisz (1999b, 1999c). 
44. See Murtha (1991). 
45. See Oxley (1997, 1999). 
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suitable measures of both the institutional environment and of contractual 
hazards are available and do support the theoretical predictions that we have set 
forth herein. Specifically, the theoretical framework that we present offers 
differential predictions as to how multinational firms investing in countries with 
weak property rights regimes will alter the governance of their transactions 
characterized by relatively low vs high contractual hazards. In countries with 
relatively weak property rights regimes or countries suffering a weakening of 
said regimes, the probability that a transaction will be organized under partner-
ship increases for transactions with low contractual hazards while it increases for 
transactions with low contractual hazards while it decreases for transactions with 
high contractual hazards. 
5. An application to recent economic crises 
An important component of recent economic crises in such countries as Thai-
land, Russia and Brazil has been the concern that actual policies, as opposed to 
ex ante pledges, may benefit insiders at the expense of local or international 
investors that lack political connections. In other words, the perceived strength 
of the property rights regime has decreased dramatically in many emerging 
markets. The theoretical arguments that we have developed lead to several 
predictions regarding the impact of differentiated hazards on investment 
and contracting in countries with varying levels of exposure to multinational 
corporate activity. 
In economies where multinational activity plays a relatively small role such as 
Russia, the primary impact of a perceived weakening of the property rights 
regime will be a reduction in the level of investment and an increase in the 
reliance by domestic firms upon the internal provision of intermediate inputs so 
as to avoid the higher perceived costs of using the courts or other official third 
party dispute resolution mechanisms when disagreements with suppliers arise. 
Alternatively, firms may eschew formal markets and rely more heavily on gray 
or black market activity and/or enforcement mechanisms.46 
While the magnitude of investment—especially in durable, nonredeployable 
assets—will similarly decline in more open economies such as Brazil or 
Thailand, the impact of a similar weakening of the property rights regime on the 
organization of economic activity is more complex in these cases. Specifically, 
for those transactions where the risk of expropriation by a counter-party is low 
due to the generic or easily imitable nature of the relevant technology or the lack 
of reliance by the multinational parent on a brand name reputation that may be 
degraded by the counter-party, weakening of the property rights regime should 
lead to a higher degree of reliance on domestic counter-parties (see the preceding 
discussion of point £A in Figure 2). These partners will provide the multinational 
parent with assistance in navigating the increasingly muddy waters of the 
domestic political arena. However, where the nature of the technology employed 
or the susceptibility to free-riding yields concerns regarding private expropria-
tion hazards, the potential benefits obtained from counter-parties in the political 
arena could be more than offset by the danger that they will manipulate the play 
46. See Braguinsky (1999). 
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in that political system to their advantage (see the preceding discussion of point 
kc in Figure 2). 
In circumstances where there has been a dramatic short-term weakening of the 
property rights regime, researchers who are able to identify well-designed 
measures of contractual hazards, such as those developed by Murtha47 and 
Oxley,48 should be able to separately observe the two distinct effects of property 
rights regimes on the organization of activity that we describe. 
6. Conclusion 
The upshot is that the bottom-up view out of which transaction cost economics 
works can tell us a good deal about the condition of the institutional environment 
and its impact on the organization of economic activity. Analysis may be 
pursued both within or between countries, on domestic or multinational in-
vestors. In each case the discriminating alignment between the level of hazards 
(contractual and/or political) and the mode of governance is prominently 
featured. 
Within a country, the choice of governance mode (market, hybrid or hier-
archy) is mainly determined by the attributes of transactions. Allowing for 
change in a given country over time or comparing domestic investors in two 
countries, more credible institutional environments support more complex econ-
omic transactions and modes of governance. Finally, extending the analysis to 
include the multinational corporation introduces the need to adapt the choice of 
governance mode in a given country to take into account the level of both 
contractual and political hazards. 
The relationship between these hazards is not, however, simply additive. That 
is because the influence of political hazards on the cost and competences of 
different organizational reforms operates through both direct (state-sector oppor-
tunism) and indirect (opportunistic use of the state) channels. Substantial 
variation in both sets of hazards, such as is provided in the open economy 
context (especially when extended to emerging markets), may be needed in order 
to empirically identify these individual effects. 
Inasmuch as the action resides in the details, this conceptual framework needs 
to be joined by deep local knowledge of both the governance of international 
transactions and the nature of political hazards. That combination is precisely 
what is in progress, as witness the recent transaction level analysis of the 
contractual hazards faced by multinational corporations developed in Murtha49 
and Oxley,50 which offer substantial improvements upon prior firm-level analy-
sis. Similar micro-analytic improvements in the measurement of property rights 
regimes provided by the host country government are also required. 
When joined with appropriate industry- or country-specific knowledge, the 
47. See Murtha (1991). 
48. See Oxley (1997). 
49. See Murtha (1993). 
50. See Oxley (1997). 
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'relentlessly calculative and comparative approach to economic organization'51 
offered by transaction cost economics can provide substantial insight into the 
reasons for differences in the structure of economic activity both across countries 
and over time. 
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